Long-term effects of governing religious commons
In some of her writings, Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom discussed the wider implications for the general prospects for democratic governance of her findings from how local communities could overcome Garrett Hardin's famous 'tragedy of the commons' problem. One example is her Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association in 1998, in which she warned that the concentration on top-down rationalistic models of government that did not put forward the importance of social trust and citizens' participation might produce 'generations of cynical citizens' that would undermine the prospects of democratic governance also at the national level (Ostrom, 1998: 18) . Another example is an article titled 'The Future of Democracy' in which Ostrom underlined that sustainable democratic governance depended on the fact that people 'over multiple generations' had learnt the importance of participation in democratic institutions (Ostrom, 2000b , cf. Ostrom, 2000a .
In this article, we will present a case for the existence of such long-term and wider effects of citizens' participation in local systems for the production and maintenance of public goods. Our case is based on a 'puzzle' provided by research on democratization, namely the lack of successful transformation to democracy in what is called the MENA region, which refers to the Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa. As noted democratization scholar Larry Diamond put it just before the 'Arab Spring': 'The continuing absence of even a single democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly -the principal exception to the globalization of democracy'. (Diamond, 2010: 93) . The most recent question in this debate is if the 'Arab Spring' of 2011 is the beginning of a steadfast path to democratization. So far it seems as if the verdict is still out (cf. Fradkin, 2013 , cf. Chaney, 2012 . As we will show, this lack of democratization cannot be explained by references to commonly used variables such as economic prosperity, religious beliefs or access to natural resources. As an alternative, we intend to provide an answer to this puzzle by focusing on the long historical traits of the organization of the local financing of religious practices through contrasting the Arab-Muslim region with Northwestern Europe, the region that historically has seen the strongest rooted tradition of representative democracy.
The argument is that in Protestantism, the local costs for religious practices have historically been organized in ways that are strikingly similar to what Elinor Ostrom found when she analyzed successful cases of how local groups had managed to organize the preservation of so-called 'common-pool resources' (Ostrom, 1990) . These local organizations had three features that are central to democratic governance, namely institutional arrangements for representation, accountability and transparency. In contrast, in the MENA region, the infrastructure needed for practicing religion has, for the most part, been managed by wealthy patrons in a type of institutional settings that featured no representation, no accountability and no transparency. We argue that the local institutions for organizing the infrastructure needed for practicing religion that we will describe below may have influenced the type of learning over generations about the prospects for democratic governance that is a central message from Ostrom's research.
Why has democracy had such a hard time in the MENA region?
A huge debate exists about the relation between Islam and democracy (cf. Chaney, 2012; Hanusch, 2013; Jamal, 2007; Potrafke, 2012; Tessler, 2002; Teorell 2010) . One argument against Islam as essentially incompatible with democracy can be found by simply looking at ordinary Muslims' political opinions. In recent years, a number of survey studies have noted an overwhelming support for democracy across the Muslim world, and this is true also for countries where the Arab-Muslim populations are a minority and also for Arab-Muslim countries were people live under autocratic rule (Braizat 2010; Fish, 2011; Jamal and Tessler, 2008; Teorell, 2010) . Furthermore, these studies show that there is no difference in support for democracy between more and less religious individuals belonging to the Muslim culture (Chaney, 2012; Ciftci, 2010; Jamal and Tessler, 2008: 101; Tessler, 2002) . For example, Haklai (2009: 35) notes that the existing body of political culture research shows that there is no single Muslim mindset regarding democracy. Political culture studies have been finding that there is no relationship between the level of piety and religiosity, on the one hand, and attitudes and values related to democracy, on the other hand.
Regarding the actual democratic performance in the Muslim world as a whole, Ibrahim (2007) reminds us that two-thirds of the planet's billion Muslims live under democratic rule, both in minority (most notably in India), majority (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Senegal as well as in Turkey), and in roughly even numbers with Christians (Nigeria and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Furthermore, as Stepan and Robertson (2003) note, the democratic track-record since at least the 1970s of the 31 non-Arab Muslim-majority countries are as good as, and in a number of cases exceed, what can be expected, considering their level of economic prosperity. This leaves us with the Arab countries in the MENA region. While Egypt and Tunisia may now be on their way to democracy, and 86% of the respondents in the states surveyed by the Arab Barometer (see Jamal and Tessler, 2008) think democracy is the best form of government, there is still no Arab country in the MENA region that can be considered a stable democracy defined as when more than one election has resulted in a change of government.
In addition to culture and religion, the system for generating wealth forms a second popular explanation for the MENA region's democratic deficit. The socalled 'oil curse' is said to have damaged the prospects for democracy (Ross, 2001; Ulfelder, 2007) . The logic behind the argument can be divided into several factors, the most cited being that a government that relies mainly upon 'windfall' natural resources for revenue grows less dependent upon taxation and thus the need to create legitimacy through representative democracy (Levi, 1988) . However, recent research shows that even heavy reliance on natural recourses does not necessarily stand in the way of democratization. (Herb, 2005; Oskarsson and Ottosen, 2010) . Furthermore, several countries in this region such as Jordan and Morocco do not have access to huge resources of oil or any other similar natural resources that can explain their lack of successful democratization.
So the puzzle remains. Teorell (2010) , who has provided what we see as the hitherto most thorough empirical investigation for why some countries have democratized and others not since the 1970s, concludes that the MENA-region puzzle can neither be explained by economic factors, nor by access to oil, nor by an absence of popular mobilization, nor by lack of neighbor diffusion, nor by popular support for democratic values and, lastly, nor by weak links to democratic regional organizations. Teorell (2010) adds that so far there is no explanation for the lack of democracy in the MENA region that stands up to an empirical scrutiny and ends his discussion by stating the following:
What we need to know is not why Islamic countries in general have been less inclined to democratize, but why this has been the case in North Africa and the Middle East. Of course, Islam as a religion could still be a part of the answer to this question. But then only those features of Islam that are unique to this particular region (Teorell, 2010: 65) .
A third explanation has recently been put forward by Chaney (2012) who argues that the lack of democratization in the MENA region can be explained by the area being conquered by Arab armies following the death of the Prophet Mohammad. This introduced an autocratic institutional equilibrium with rulers and religious leaders working in a close alliance that since then has been inimical to democracy. Chaney argues that the use of slaves in the Arab armies concentrated power in the hands of rulers and prevented the rise of a semiindependent class of landowning nobles as a basis for rulers to acquire military capacity. In Western Europe, the need for rulers to rely on the independent landed nobility contributed to democratization in the West by challenging central authority. While one of the most interesting approaches to the lack of democratization in the Arab countries, we take issue with this analysis on two accounts. First, to our knowledge, the class of landed nobility has generally not been in the forefront for introducing democracy in the West. The typical local feudal institutions in the West, for example the Junker type of rule in Germany, can hardly be seen as 'schools' for learning democratic governance. Second, Chaney argues that the system of slave-based armies in the Arab countries created an alliance between rulers and religious leaders that prevented the emergence of an independent civil society in which groups could challenge the central authority. The problem here is that this theory lacks an explanation for why the religious leaders in the Arab counties became so closely connected to the autocratic rulers and why a semi-independent religious sector did not emerge. Below, we will expand on Chaney's analysis by showing that the differences in how religion was financed historically have been substantial between the two regions under comparison. These differences are likely to have had a great impact on the divergence in the religious sector's independence from political authority and, by extension, in the fostering of democratic practices at the communal level.
Follow the money: a political-economic explanation
As Teorell (2010) underlines, blaming specific religions for hindering democratization has proved to be a false road. As he points out, in the 1970s, Catholicism was thought to hinder democratization but since then southern Europe and large parts of Latin America have democratized. In the same manner, Confucianism was thought to be anathema to democracy but this has been disproved by the democratization of South Korea and Taiwan. It should be added that, on the other end of the spectrum, there is not much that speaks in favor of the argument that the inherent religious message in Protestantism has 'created democracy' either (Bruce, 2004) .
Our central argument is that the lack of democracy in the MENA region should not be explained by Islam as a religion, but by how religion has been financed. A starting point is that religious practices usually come with a quite elaborate and expensive infrastructure. Churches and mosques have to be built and maintained, religious leaders must be hired and get salaries, religious schools and seminars have to be established, burial grounds have to be bought and kept in order, etc. From a strict technical point, these are not necessarily to be seen as public goods since individuals that have not contributed resources can be hindered from using them. However, both Christianity and Islam have strong norms against such exclusion practices, for example hindering poor people from entering churches and mosques or taking part in other religious services. It is more difficult to define if religious service also fulfills the other criteria for what should count as a pure public good, namely non-rivalry. One person attending a religious service does not subtract from another person attending the same service. However, when it comes to education or more personal services, this problem could of course occur. In any case, these religious services do present a collective action problem because 'excluding non-contributors' is not a trivial problem and may result in a serious lack of infrastructure needed for religious practice (Ostrom, 2003: 241) . The members of religious communities that fail to solve such a collective action problem do not, as a rule, risk financial ruin as an effect of depleted natural resources, as in the cases analyzed by Ostrom. Nevertheless, the destruction of a community's religious infrastructure brings the equally harrowing risk that its members cannot properly execute one's religious duties and, as such, spiritual ruin. Simply put, for devout Christians and Muslims, living in a local community without a common infrastructure for religious practices, they face a situation in which their prospect for eternal salvation looks grim. This implies that the collective action problem we analyze is a parallel to the 'common-pool resources' problem that was the basis of Ostrom's research.
In addition, in both Muslim and Christian societies, the local religious organizations (in the Christian West this has been the parishes, in the MENA region the waqfs, which are religious endowments) have historically been responsible for a whole host of other public services such as social assistance, religious as well as secular education and, in many cases, also important parts of the local infrastructure such as roads and system for water provision. As we will show, the system for financing these local activities, both the religious and the non-religious ones, has historically been very different when we compare the Arab-Muslim and the Northwestern Christian world.
Our central idea for explaining the lack of democratization in the MENA region is thus the one used in political economy, namely to 'follow the money', as initially suggested by Palmstierna (2009) . Following the approach known as 'fiscal sociology', we argue for the existence of a causal mechanism between type of taxation and type of government. According to this approach, we should expect taxation in general -and more direct forms of taxes in particular -to constitute a significant and important part of the social contract between the citizens and the state (Campbell, 1993; Levi, 1988; Schumpeter, 1991) . Scholars adopting this perspective have demonstrated that rulers who depend on direct taxation for their survival are much more likely to care about constructing legitimate forms of government than rulers that do not rely on direct taxation for their survival.
In attempting to account for how the Middle East lagged behind the West in terms of economic development during the last millennium, Kuran (2011) employs a similar strategy. Rather than focusing on previously offered existing explanations, such as the production of knowledge and the features of state structure, Kuran places his analytical focus on the progress of the corporation, an entity that struggled to develop under the Ottoman legal system. In focusing on the advances of private organizations, our approach is related. The main difference is that we want to explain the lag in democratization. Where Kuran speaks of the importance of the corporation for economic prosperity, what attracts our interest is the democracy-generating significance of its public version, the local municipality.
In this, we build on research that shows that taxation cannot only be seen an administrative system for the authorities to collect revenue. Instead, with taxation usually follows two other things. First, for rulers to extract resources, installing systems for popular consent to ensure legitimacy is likely to increase the amount of revenue they can collect (Bräutigam et al., 2008; Levi, 1988; Levi and Sacks, 2009) . Second, taxation also increases demands for accountability and transparency in public affairs (Persson, 2008) . The reason behind this is that people who pay taxes will demand a system in which 'the books can be checked'. Moreover, people will not be willing to part with their money if the tax administration (and the public administration more generally) is known to be corrupt, discriminatory or engages in other forms of favoritism (Rothstein, 2011) . This has been stated as follows:
The state-building role of taxation can be seen in two principal areas: the rise of a social contract based on bargaining around tax, and the institutionbuilding stimulus provided by the revenue imperative. Progress in the first area may foster representative democracy. Progress in the second area strengthens state capacity. Both have the potential to bolster the legitimacy of the state and enhance accountability between the state and its citizens (Bräutigam et al., 2008: 1). In brief, our solution to the MENA-region puzzle is that when financing religion, the Arab-Muslim and the European-Christian parts of the world have historically relied on two very different systems. We want to draw special attention to the local level where religion (and its related activities) has been financed 'from above' in the Arab-Muslim world by a special type of foundation that has been insulated from influences from the majority of people in the community. Since people in the Arab-Muslim world as a general rule have not had to pay taxes for the religious services, and to a large extent, not also for other services handled by the local religious organizations, neither demand 'from below' nor a need 'from above' for representation, accountability and transparency have been established. The system for financing religious practices has been radically different in the North European-Christian world where these public goods have for the most part been financed 'from below' through the local congregations or parishes. As we will show, historically this has come with a surprisingly intricate system for semi-(or proto-) democratic representation, transparency and accountability that to a large extent resembles what Ostrom found when studying successful cases of 'governing the commons'.
In accounting for the local perspective, we have been fortunate to be able to draw on some excellent, but highly specialized, historical research about the organization of parishes, communes and the systems of funding religion and welfare in these two different parts of the world. For Europe, we have concentrated specifically of studies England and from the 16th century and onward, and Sweden from the 17th century. As for their counterpart in the Arab-Muslim world, with a focus on the Ottoman Empire we have relied on similar sources. Analyzing this fascinating historical research, we have found two diametrically different ways of how to 'finance religion' which in its turn has led to two different ways of how to organize local political representation, accountability and transparency.
The MENA region: the local waqf-fare state
The dominant form in the Arab-Muslim world for financing local religious services and other local public goods has revolved around a specific and unique foundation-type institution known as the waqf (in Arabic [pl. awqaf]; in Turkish vakif). The term loosely translates to 'forbidding movement, transport or exchange of something' (Raissouni, 2001) . A waqf is a religious (widely defined) endowment, originally intended for charitable use. The historical origin of this institution is unclear, but already Mohammed encouraged the establishment of such an arrangement. Similar institutions are known to have existed in the Byzantine Empire, as well as ancient Persia (Makdisi, 1981: 227) . While the waqf institutions and its practice exist to this day, albeit on a much-diminished scale, the focus of this study will revolve around its historical significance and the legacy it has left behind. Indeed, the waqf system has existed, and does to this day, across the Muslim world, including contemporary democracies such as India and Indonesia. Still, the further away from the Arabian Peninsula we get, the historical legacy of the ties between the Muslim institution(s) and the formation of states grow weaker, due to the influence of competing powers, such as far Eastern and Western colonizers and traders; although the historical evidence on the matter is relatively scarce, there is some evidence pointing to the fact that out of the Muslim 'Gunpowder Empires', waqf was used much more extensively in the Ottoman and Safavid empires, the area we today (broadly) define as the Middle East, whereas the rulers of Mughal India relied more upon other, more direct and less institutionalized, ways of funding welfare projects (Kozlowski, 1995) . Due to its uniquely long-standing rule and heavy institutional influence over the MENA region, the Ottoman Empire is a particularly suitable empirical focus for this study. In addition, it will occasionally draw examples from outside the region in order to further illustrate the micro-level effects of a waqf-funded public service system.
Due to its many uses, as well as its long history, the waqf institution is certainly a complex one, and only the core of its features and aspects can be dealt with here. What we can conclude is that it seems to have had an immensely important role in shaping the social, political and economic fabric of Middle Eastern life for centuries. Marshall Hodgson (1974a: 124) has characterized the waqf system as the 'vehicle for financing Islam as a society'. As an example, at the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, three quarters of all arable land in Turkey was waqf land (Kuran, 2001: 849) . Awqaf were the major producers of many public goods, which could take the shape of mosques, soup kitchens [which in the 18th century fed 30,000 of a total of 700,000 citizens of Constantinople (Kuran, 2001: 850) ], schools of higher learning (Medrasahs), roads, and water fountains, among other things (Yüksel, 1997) . It was thereby possible for a person to live in a veritable 'waqf-fare state', quite able to accompany an individual from the cradle to the grave. As one observer notes: thanks to the prodigious development of the waqf institution, a person could be born in a house belonging to a waqf, sleep in a cradle of that waqf and fill up on its food, receive instruction through waqf-owned books, become a teacher in a waqf school, draw a waqf financed salary, and, at his death, be placed in a waqf-provided coffin for burial in a waqf cemetery. In short, it was possible to meet all one's needs through goods and services immobilized as waqf. (Yediylldlz, 1990 : 5, as cited in Kuran, 2001: 851) As Hodgson (1974a: 124) concludes: 'through the waqfs, the various civic essentials and even amenities were provided for on a private yet dependable basis without need or fear of the intervention of political power'. As for the macroeconomic effects, Ç izakça (2000: 8) notes that 'economists looking at the waqf system would be perplexed by the fact that a myriad of essential services such as health and educational services have historically been provided at no cost whatsoever to the government'. We should add that these services were thus provided without the need for taxation. Ç izakça continues to note that, for the issue of income distribution, 'taxation [was] definitely assigned a secondary role'. Furthermore, waqf property itself was generally not subject to taxation (Darling, 1996: 47) . A waqf would generally consist of two parts: the charitable institution in question, and the revenue-raising side, i.e. investments, which would often be agricultural land or property, generating dues, and as time progressed, cash that could yield interest over time (Faroqhi, 1974; Inalcik, 1969: 133) .
Available historical studies show that the waqf system has not been the only means of funding of religious infrastructure and social welfare within Islam. The well-known institution of Zakat, regularized almsgiving of a certain proportion of one's wealth, is considered as one of Islam's five pillars. However, as Hodgson (1974b: 214) notes, after the initial expansion of Islam, the giving of Zakat was largely replaced by the waqf, as 'zakât alms became an incidental personal obligation, on which few or no religious institutions were dependent'.
Founders of Awqaf generally tended to be, but were not exclusively, families of large wealth and influence, most notably members of the religious and military aristocracy (Barnes, 1986: 154) . Motives, besides religious piety and a charitable urge, for founding a waqf were plentiful. For one, thanks to weaknesses in Islamic property rights and strictness of Shari'ah inheritance laws, a 'family waqf' was one of few means to protect a family's wealth (Kuran, 2001: 853) . Another often-cited reason for establishing a waqf was to increase the family's social standing and prestige, which in turn could generate patronage power and political clout (Makdisi, 1981: 40) . By devoting a waqf deed (waqfiyyat) to the educational sector and religious schools (madrasahs), the founder could stipulate what was being thought in the schools: Just as important, the founder could accrue influence and patronage among the ulama, the important class of religious scholars in Muslim societies who were among the prime beneficiaries, and not seldom caretakers, of the waqf system (Makdisi, 1981: 40; Sedgwick, 2003: 40; Zürcher, 1994: 18) .
Although sultans and members of the ruling elite tended to be amongst the prime patrons of waqf endowments, they did so as private persons, rather than as officials of the regime. Makdisi (1981: 281) describes how this religiouseducational practice was institutionalized in Arab-Muslim countries:
A private individual, the founder, instituted as waqf his own privately owned property for a public purpose, that of educating a segment of Muslim society, which he chose, in one or more of the religious sciences . . . He created his foundation by an act of his own free will, without interference from any authority or power. Even when the founder was a caliph or sultan or other highly placed functionary, he created an institution in his capacity as a private individual. . . . the state, that is, the governing power had no control over the curriculum, or the methods of instruction, any more than did it over the foundation of the institution. Peri (1992) shows that this limitation of institutional authority was not confined to the educational system. In addition, through the waqf system, the rulers -be they Caliphs or local notables -could provide social welfare, religious services and other public services to their subjects or clients in order to strengthen their power and over the local community. Peri further adds that through this system, the rulers could increase their power 'far beyond what they could achieve through the formal frameworks of power that were under their hand' (Peri, 1992: 174; cf. Shatzmiller, 2001: 60) . Moreover, the founder of a waqf was free to appoint the chief administrator, the mutawalli, who could be a member of the founder's own family, and often an ulama. This position has often been inherited, thus generating a dynastic form of influence over the institution. This made it difficult for beneficiaries, or stakeholders, and of course the local population, to weather complaints regarding maintenance of the waqf or garner insight into its operations. As Baer puts it:
A charitable or religious institution, or 'the poor' for that matter, had little power over the family administrator, and recurrent government attempts to impose such control failed completely until the middle of the twentieth century, not least of all because the provisions established in waqfiyyat were often ambiguous. Administrators also were able to provide members of their family with material advantages deriving from the waqf, such as the perpetual lease of waqf property. (Baer, 1997: 270) Awqaf were thus not only top-down institutions, but under the power of one trustee who was appointed or inherited the position rather than being elected, highly informal in nature. As such, contrary to Western parishes and other local communes (see below), the waqf administration was not accountable to the people that used their services, which diminished the need for developing accounting rules. Even as mutawallis were conducting their work with the interest of the people in mind, the awqaf inherently lacked the institutional devices 'from below' to change and adapt to new conditions, as the endowments were subject to the 'dead hand' of the founder's stipulation, whether it be recent or centuries old. Notably, Kuran argues that, '[u]nlike western municipalities and other governmental agencies, which were authorized to tax constituents, change their own budgets and impose new ordinances, the waqf system could not make the necessary adaptations' (Kuran, 2004: 78) . Moreover, Yayla (2007: 14) refers to the bookkeeping system of the waqf as nothing 'more than an "accounting of conscience"'. In a study of the waqf system in Palestine after the British takeover, Reiter (1996: xiii) notes how only those directly involved with the workings of the endowment, hence not including its beneficiaries, had insight into its accounts and 'inner workings'. Although the modern-day waqf institution has changed in many ways, its management is still fraught with problems with 'no transparency and lack of accountability' (Ibrahim et al., 2006: 27) .
During the modernization efforts of the latter 19th and throughout the 20th centuries, which brought forth greater state involvement, the waqf system suffered a decline in use, but it has for the last few decades shown signs of recovery. Centralization processes themselves underwent great difficulties due to the difficulties in establishing the worth of the myriad of awqaf, along with dishonest bureaucrats who themselves managed to embezzle significant portions of the revenue they were set to gather (Barnes, 1986: 155-156; Ç izakça, 1997: 14) . Furthermore, the initial shaping of the municipal system occurred in tandem with an authoritative centralization process, which left the municipalities with little autonomous power, and 'no personality of its own' (Ortayli, 1978 , as cited in Ersoy 1992 . In the 1950s, Charles Issawi (1956: 39) also noted the weakness of municipalities and cooperative associations in the MENA region, as the citizens now turned directly to the (authoritarian) central governments for social services.
There is certainly some variation in the MENA region that could speak against our argument. Especially, Turkey stands out as a recent democracy. The Ottoman reforms launched during the mid-19th century (Tanzimat) were designed to break with the old, patrimonial systems of authority. However, Anderson (1987, p. 5) argues that '[w]ell before these efforts were to bear all their fruit, . . . , Ottoman administrative development was suspended when the Europeans dismantled the empire after World War I'. In particular, Turkey, as the power center of the old Empire, managed to retain most of the existing Western type of bureaucratic achievements. The result in Turkey was not the development of (semi-) independent local government institutions but instead a system wherein the centralized bureaucratic state and military elite came to dominate society (Sosay, 2009; Sozen and Shaw, 2002: 480) .
Seen in a larger context, the waqf system illustrates a feature that, in different shapes, reproduced itself for at least a thousand years, wherein the state functionally separated its responsibilities from 'softer' societal areas, such as religion, education and welfare -a task left to the religious authorities, and funded by the waqf system. Without having to introduce a system of regularized taxation for these types of public goods, the waqf system took care of religious services, schooling and social welfare as well as handling mediation of local disputes (Lapidus, 1996: 18) . As stated by Kuran
The waqf system represented, in effect, an implicit bargain between rulers and their wealthy subjects. Rulers made a credible commitment to leave certain property effectively in private hands; in return, waqf founders agreed to supply social services, thus unburdening the state of potential responsibilities. (Kuran, 2004: 75) As we interpret this, a wealthy family could protect much of their wealth over very long periods of time by creating a waqf. In exchange, the waqf would finance the religious services and also other social services in their local area.
An effect of this system was that the local community using the services did not have to pay for them and thereby could not claim any influence in the form of representation or systems for accountability or transparency. To use the terminology from studies of state building, the waqf system led to a lasting legacy of personalism, patronage and lack of accountability. In fact, as Berman (2009: 225) states, the waqf system was effectively 'crowding out the need to organize municipal provision that would have required tax collection'. In sum, this system of financing local public goods such as religious services solved collective action problems by making both the beneficiaries and the formal state agents 'freeriders' by distancing them both from responsibility and influence over its upkeep. A final example from outside the MENA region illustrates the dislodging of control, both from forces above, such as the state, and below, the citizens:
The people of Zanzibar did not regard waqf resources as 'public' revenues to be applied by formal and impersonal procedure. Neither did they regard charity or mosque upkeep as tasks pertaining to a state bureaucracy. Those matters were the task of patrons-be it the Sultan or any other wealthy member of the local elites. The same notions of patronage entailed, of course, that waqf was not conceived as a strictly 'private' resource, either. (Oberauer, 2008: 341) This failure to install the institutional framework of representation, accountability and transparency into the upkeep of the commons serves, as we will demonstrate in the following section, as a stark contrast to medieval and early-modern Northwestern Europe.
Northwestern Europe: communalism in the parishes
The central concept for understanding the European equivalent to the waqf-fare state is communalism which has been developed in a number of historical works by Peter Blickle who has investigated the role of local pre-democratic structures in Western Europe from the 15th to the 17th centuries (Aronsson, 1992a: 25-28 and 1992b; Blickle, 1989 Blickle, , 1997 Blickle, , 2000 . Largely, communalism is defined as the capacity of a town or village to take charge of and promote its interests against the feudal hierarchy. This capacity was based on the commune's power to manage its economic, religious and social affairs by establishing local rules including forms for handling transgression of such rules. Moreover, the enactment of this local regulatory authority did not, according to Blickle, depend on any lordly consent, which would have been antithetical to the commune's claim to assert its own interests. Communalism thus stands as an alternative to feudalism and absolutism that has dominated much historical research of politics and power in Europe during this period.
The most important political structure of these communal arrangements, which according to Blickle had the same basic form in towns and country villages, was the communal or parish assembly, usually an annual meeting with all the householders. This was a proto-democratic structure in which they had to deliberate and decide upon issues that affected the entire commune and, important in this analysis, decide about fees and taxes. Five features of this type of local governance are emphasized by Blickle. One is the idea of egalitarianism in the assembly represented by the practice of one vote per household irrespective of the economic standing. The second is the notion of the existence of 'a common good'. The third is the idea to elect representatives for managing these 'common goods' and the fourth is that these representatives should be held accountable for how they handled economic resources and implemented the locally decided rules and regulations. The fifth principle is that for accountability to be possible, transparency in 'public affairs' was needed. Especially after the reformation, it was common that these local institutions came to have considerable political power, not least taking responsibility for the local religious services. As Kümin (1996: 11) states regarding the situation in the 16th century: 'Having achieved a strong political and legal position, many rural and urban communities in Central Europe began to supervise the moral life of their clergy, to administer parish funds, . . . political and religious power was anything but a monopoly of traditional feudal elites'. A detailed study of three local parishes in Sweden during the 16th and 17th centuries reveals that the commoners could exercise a considerable amount of self-governance, not least in ecclesiastical affairs. This study points at the connection between control of the economic resources 'from below' and power over the church practices:
The material responsibility for the church, the vicarage, and the parish treasury, gave the peasants a material advantage which could be transformed in part into an ideological resource . . . the popular view of what constituted good cultic practice and good divine services could be formulated with a greater degree of legitimacy. (Aronsson, 1992a: 347) It should be added that, in general, the parishes were not used as local organization for implementing policies or for the collection of taxes as an agent for aristocracy or the central state. Tax collection for the central state was in general carried out by separate administrative entities (Cederholm, 2007: 346) . Moreover, the elected churchwardens in England could be sworn in when the Bishops made their visitations, but 'ecclesiastical officials had no authority to refuse or dismiss them. Their principal loyalty was to their community, not the Church' (Kümin, 1996: 29) .
What seems to have characterized the forms of decisions at the parish assembly meetings was a strong emphasis on reaching consensus and to view the goods that the parish had responsibility for as 'common goods'. Both in the English and the Swedish cases as well as in the areas in Continental Europe covered by Blickle's studies, there seems to have been very little of 'politics as interest struggle' within the parishes and other communal local assemblies (Aronsson, 1992a; Cederholm, 2007: 546; Kümin 1996 ; see also Gustafsson, 1989) . Instead, it seems as if the type of politics resembles what is described by Elinor Ostrom (1990) in her analyses of modern-day local communities trying to 'govern the commons'. However, this local consensus for the common good type of politics did in many instances give rise to a vertical type of conflict between the local communal bodies vis-à-vis the central church as well as the feudal lords (Blickle, 2000; Cederholm, 2007) . Aronsson (1992a) also underlines that during the 18th century, the area of responsibility for the local parishes in Sweden started to grow. A number of secular responsibilities came under the jurisdiction of local communal board such as care for the destitute, the establishment of public schools, local systems for credit and insurance and infrastructure. The same is true for the English parishes, although it seems to have come about earlier, namely that the parishes extended their responsibilities to things such as the 'maintenance or roads and bridges, the relief of the poor and the preservation of public order' (see also French, 2001) . From the beginning of the 17th century, managing poor relief became a heavy responsibility for the locally elected officeholders in the parishes, who had to collect special taxes for this purpose and, not least, distribute the relief and by this deciding who was eligible and if deemed eligible, how much they should be given according to (their interpretation of) the rules (Hindle, 2004: 296-298; cf. French, 2001) .
Regarding the positions as churchwarden and members of the parish council, in Sweden these positions circulated so that over a decade, almost every landholding peasant had been an elected representative (Aronsson, 1992a: 309) . In a similar manner, studies of the structure of the English parishes show that the central position as churchwarden in practice circulated among 'ordinary people' and that it was customary that no one could have the position for more than two years. Although the position could carry quite large economic and administrative responsibilities, churchwardens in England represented a surprisingly wide spectrum of the social strata such as bakers, blacksmiths, butchers, shopkeepers, tailors and carpenters (Kümin, 1996: 30) . People from the gentry rarely appeared, but it should be noted that on some rare occasions women could be elected a warden.
Thus, the picture that emerges is a system for managing and financing local religious practices and later many secular practices that is a complete opposite of the waqf system. After the reformation in Northwestern Europe, it was local semi-democratic political structures with elected representatives that decided and collected the taxes, decided upon building and maintenance of the religious temples and other constructions and also had a considerable influence over religious practices. There is, however, one more feature of this system of 'communalism' in Northwestern Europe that needs to be pointed out. As stated above, present-day Arab-Muslim countries do lack not only democracy but also 'quality of government'. In a comparative perspective, and especially given their current economic standard, they are to a higher degree than could be expected ridden by problems of corruption, clientelism and patronage. A very likely reason for this is that the economic transactions within the waqf system have lacked institutionalized forms for transparency and accountability. As we have described above, the people who use the religious or social services produced by the waqf system usually have not paid taxes to the waqf system and from which it follows that they have little reason to demand transparency and accountability. From our readings of the history of the parish system in Northwestern Europe, the situation has been the complete opposite. For reason of space, we will concentrate on the situation in the English parishes during the late medieval period. The first thing to note is that the elected churchwardens came to control substantial amounts of money and other resources. As Kümin states the wardens administered, bought, and sold property, organized collections of certain feasts, lent out money and various church goods, received testamentary bequests and contributions by local guilds, staged entertainments, and demanded fees for bell ringing or burial, while spending money on church maintenance, ornaments, salaries, subsidies, bridge-building, legal matters, priests and ceremonies (Kümin, 1996: 29) .
There is no doubt that the economic resources that could be entrusted to a churchwarden were substantial. Contrary to the administrators of the waqf system, churchwardens usually kept a strict separation between their private money and the communal resources they were elected to administer. Several historians have pointed out how remarkably detailed and to the minute the accounts were kept, not least considering that this was before literacy was common among the English commoners (Kümin, 1996: 221; see also French, 2001 ). This is a stark contrast to the 'accounting of conscience' in the waqf system mentioned above. Moreover, in the parishes, audit regulations were strict making the churchwardens accountable to those who had elected them. At the yearly parish assembly, all accounts and receipts were scrutinized, the 'audit day was an opportunity for the parish assembly to exercise its sovereignty' (Kümin, 1996: 30) .
Conclusions: the legacy of long-term institutional effects
The revenue that governments need can be generated from several sources, such as spoils of war, owning land, establishing monopolies or capitalizing on natural resources. However, the most important stream of public finances has arguably been taxation from the subjects. In order to successfully do this, states and local governments have to develop an administrative infrastructure sufficient to collect enough taxes and this will be more effective if a certain degree of consent from the taxpayers can be established (Bräutigam et al., 2008; Levi, 1988) . As predicted by the 'fiscal sociology' approach, direct taxation of citizens is likely to be more effective if the government is seen as legitimate by a majority and this will increase rulers' propensity for establishing institutions that can generate consent such as representative democracy. If citizens do not have to pay substantial amounts in direct taxes, they have less reason to demand representation, accountability and transparency in public affairs simply because 'it is not their money' (Persson and Rothstein, 2012) . As the 'communalist' approach in European history suggests, the Western historical trajectory of modernization has meant that the state over time has been able to integrate various local proto-democratic political systems into a state-building project built on citizens' consent. As we have shown, there are clear and systematic differences in the nature of the (mostly Lutheran) Northern European and the Arabic-Islamic social contracts at the very local level, which we argue have contributed to the current differences in the social basis for democracy between the two regions. Although outside the available space for this article, we believe that a more fine-grained analysis comparing the differences between Catholic and Lutheran parishes would reveal the same differences in representation and accountability as we have presented here. This would be in line with research showing that predominantly Catholic countries historically have had a more troubled relation with establishing representative democracy than have predominantly Lutheran countries (Coriden, 1997; Teorell, 2010) .
The most important result of our comparison is that we may have found the answer to the puzzling lack of democratization in the MENA region. Our answer is, in one sentence, that this has neither been caused by the (Islamic) religion as such, nor by a specific Arab set of cultural norms toward democracy, nor by an abundant of natural resources. Instead, we argue that the lack of successful democratization in the Arab-Muslim world can be explained by how religious practices historically have been financed. In the Northern Europe, religion has for the most part been financed 'from below' from which has followed the development of proto-democratic forms of representation, transparency and accountability. In the Arab-Muslim countries, religion has for the most part been financed 'from above', thereby hindering the development of such semidemocratic systems for representation, accountability and transparency in public affairs. Our comparison shows that historically, for these two parts of the world, we can speak of two diametrically different systems for 'governing religion'. We want again to underline that the local organizations for governing religion in both areas also came to handle a number of secular matters such as legal advice, poverty relief, early forms of 'social insurance' and important types of infrastructure. The importance of the political-economy side of the religion and politics nexus has, to our knowledge, been lacking in existing research. For example, it is not dealt with in any of the 25 chapters in the recently published Handbook of Religion and Politics (Haynes, 2008) .
Although many reminiscences of these historical institutional forms remain to this day, not least in the form of clan loyalties (Palmstierna, 2009) , one can, of course, argue if the practices dating many centuries back, as the ones we have described here, really can explain today's situation regarding the lack of democracy in the MENA region and the stability of the democratic system of governance in Northwestern Europe. To this, we would like to make two arguments, one theoretical and one empirical. The first argument is that, although what we have analyzed above has been strictly confined to institutional forms, one can argue that institutions such as these, which have been operating for a very long time, will translate into cultural norms and habits, entities that North has labeled 'shared mental models' (North, 1998) . The reason is that formal institutions that have been operating for a very long time can simply get taken for granted, which means that the distinction between institution and culture (or formal and informal institutions) as explanations becomes blurred. In his study of local politics in Sweden, Aronsson argues that one result of the influence the Swedish peasant from at least the late 16th century had in their local assemblies over many important church-related as well as secular matters was the development of a political self-consciousness which brought an increased knowledge of the government system and its officials, and also made possible an emerging 'civic' and self-regulative consciousness. This in turn led to an increase in power resources and the potential for collective action (Aronsson, 1992b: 44) . This is very much in line with Ostrom's argument that the different institutional arrangements in which citizens learnt (or did not learn) to handle collective action problems (as the one we have described) developed a specific mindset about the role of ordinary people in managing public goods at the local level. There are reasons to believe that this, 'over multiple generations' (Ostrom, 2000b: 280) , translated into various degrees of support and demand for democracy at the national level.
The foundation for our empirical argument comes from several studies showing that contemporary variation in important political and social outcomes has been shown to have deep historical roots that can be traced back to institutions that were established centuries ago. One of the most well-known analyses in this vein is Robert Putnam's (1993) study of social capital in modernday Italy, where he traces the large difference between the Italian south and north back to the political institutions that were established during the 14th and 15th centuries (city-states in the North, absolutist feudalism in the south). In addition to the wealth of empirical research Putnam and his research associates produced to confirm their finding, we can add that a very recent survey of corruption and other forms of problems in government institutions at the regional level in European Union member states gives a remarkable support to Putnam's study (Charron et al., 2013) . Regions in northern Italy are, according to this survey, as clean from corruption and similar practices as is Denmark, while Italy's southern regions are among the most corrupt in Europe and have a quality of government likely far below many developing countries in, for example, subSaharan Africa. In another study testing Putnam's theory, Guiso et al. (2008) show that Italian cities that had self-governance a thousand years ago still have higher levels of social capital today and that this variation is considerable both in the northern and in the southern Italian regions. As they state, their results show that 'positive experiences of cooperation at the local level can have extremely long lasting effects ' (2008: 27) . How the causality actually operates over such long periods remains an open question, but as these and several other recent studies show, historical legacies in institutions for governance seem to have very long-lasting political effects (e.g. Giuliano and Nunn, 2013; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Voigtländer and Voth, 2011) .
We argue that these studies, as well as ours, support Ostrom's argument about the importance of 'history, institutions and culture' for explaining the prospects for the future of democratic governance (Ostrom, 1991: 242) .
